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Abstract
This article analyzes the extent to which the Basic Benefit Package (BBP), a subsidized
health program in Armenia, increases utilization and affordability of outpatient health care
among the poor. We find that beneficiaries of the BBP pay approximately 45 % less in fees
for doctor visits (and display 36 % higher outpatient utilization rates) than eligible users not
receiving the BBP. However, even among BBP beneficiaries the level of outpatient health
care utilization remains low. This occurs because the program mainly provides discounted
fees for doctor visits, but fees do not constitute the main financial constraint for users. Our
estimates suggest that other non-fee expenditures, such as prescription medicines, constitute a
more significant financial constraint and are not subsidized by the BBP. As a result,
outpatient health care remains expensive even for BBP beneficiaries.
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This article analyzes the extent to which the Basic Benefit Package (BBP), a 
subsidized health program in Armenia, increases health care utilization and affordability 
among health users. Health care utilization rates in Armenia have been declining at 
alarming rates. According to the WHO (World Health Organization) data, while in the 
early 1990s outpatient utilization in Armenia was at 7 contacts per person per year, in 
2005 it had declined to 2 contacts per year (see Figure 1). This indicator is below the 
regional average, which oscillates between 6 and 10 contacts per person per year. 
Inpatient utilization is also very low. While inpatient care admissions in the region vary 
between 15 and 20 per 100 inhabitants per year, in Armenia the rate is less than 8 per 100 
inhabitants (i.e. about half of the regional average compared to the 1990 or 1995 level). 
Declining utilization has occurred mainly as a consequence of a quasi-privatization of 
health services in Armenia after the end of the Soviet era, which permitted hospitals and 
doctors to generate revenues by selling health services to the public.  
In response to decreasing utilization, the government of Armenia has designed a 
social assistance program to provide health services (free-of-charge or highly subsidized) 
to the poor and most vulnerable groups of the population.
1 International experience 
suggests that public health care subsidies may contribute to higher utilization and 
improve health outcomes such as under-five-mortality (Newman et al., 2002; Alderman 
and Lavy, 1996; Lavy et al., 1996, and Mwanbu et al., 1993). The Basic Benefits Package 
was introduced in 1998. Since January 2001, the government has extended the free-of-
charge BBP program to all beneficiaries of the poverty family benefit system, which is a 
government adopted means-tested benefit program that provides a series of health and 
non-health services to the poor. The BBP package comes in two forms: the first targets a 
segment of the population considered vulnerable (based on an eligibility criteria), 
providing them with free health care services at all levels, with the exception of some 
specific costly services (e.g. transplants) and less essential services (e.g. expensive dental 
services and cosmetic surgery). The second, more limited, type of BBP is provided to the 
non-vulnerable or general population. This package requires co-payments for certain 
home visits, antenatal and postnatal care (provided by gynecologists or nurses), a large 
part of dispensary outpatient care, and a selection of hospital services. This article 
focuses on the first type of BBP assistance only.  
In principle, BBP recipients should get free health care at hospitals, while the rest 
of the users pay fees (no official co-payments apply to the first type of BBP services and 
some exceptions apply). In practice, due to funding shortages, BBP beneficiaries continue 
to pay out-of-pocket for medicines and for informal payments to doctors and practitioners 
for treatment (see Angel-Urdinola et al., 2006). Informal payments are common because 
government reimbursements for BBP services, which are transferred from the State 
Treasury directly to health care facilities, are generally low and take time to disburse.  
In this article we use data from the 2004 Armenia Integrated Living Standard 
Survey (ILSC) to analyze the extent to which access to poverty family benefit system 
                                                 
1 The program targets families of disabled persons, war veterans, single-parent and orphaned children under the age of 
18, disabled children under the age of 16, families with four or more children under the age of 18, prisoners, 
participants of the Chernobyl disaster liquidation activities, among others.   2
(and thereby to free-of-charge BBP) promotes health care utilization. The 2004 ILSC 
data provides information on whether families are registered in the poverty family 
benefits system and, if registered, on whether they actually receive benefits or not. As 
such, data from the 2004 ILSC provides an ideal scenario to perform a quasi-random 
evaluation of the program. First, observable characteristics between users in the treatment 
and control groups are likely to similar because the program administration determines 
eligibility based on a points-based-score according to the socio-economic characteristics 
of the applicants. Second, households who register to receive the benefits are also likely 
to have similar unobservable characteristics since registration to the program occurs 
through self-selection. Finally, data suggest that some of the users who should get the 
benefit (i.e. those registered and eligible) do not. This may occur because the program 
administration in some localities displays long processing-times and/or capacity 
constraints. 
2 
The main findings can be summarized as follows: eligible users registered in the 
poverty family benefit systems who receive BBP benefits (the treatment group) pay 
approximately 45 % less for outpatient treatment than eligible users registered in the 
program but not yet receiving benefits (the control group).  As a consequence of such 
price discounts, eligible beneficiaries of the BBP display a 36 % higher probability of 
seeking outpatient health care when needed sick as compared with non-beneficiaries. 
However, even among those eligible for BBP outpatient utilization remains low. This 
happens because although the BBP relieves some financial burden in relation to doctor 
fees, outpatient health care requires large additional out-of-pocket expenditures (mainly 
on prescription medicines). The rest of the paper is structured as follows: section 2 
describes the data and our methodological strategy; section 3 discusses the main results; 
the article ends with a brief conclusion.  
 
2.   Data and Methodology 
 
  Data used for the purposes of this study comes from the 2004 Armenian 
Integrated Living Standard Survey (ILCS). The survey has been conducted since 1996 by 
the National Statistical Service of Armenia, with support from the World Bank, USAID, 
and other donors. The survey collects information on household characteristics, such as 
household assets, intra-household transfers, and housing; and on individual 
characteristics, such as migration, health, education, and employment. Data are stratified, 
nationally representative, and provide detailed information on household income and 
consumption. The sample of the 2004 ILCS is based on the population structure of the 
2001 population census. It includes 6,816 households and 26,614 individuals. The data 
contains 43 urban sample units and 216 rural sample units, which makes the survey 
representative at the level of the eleven main regions in Armenia (or Marzs). 
The health module of the survey collects information on morbidity, access, and 
expenditures on health by type of doctor, type of expenditure (i.e. official vs. unofficial 
payments), type of health provider, self-perceptions of health status, and postnatal 
                                                 
2  Although fully randomized social experiments are considered more appropriate for program impact evaluation 
(Grossman, 1994; Holland, 1986; and Newman et. al, 1994), non experimental evaluations such as the one presented 
here provide an alternative evaluation method for programs like the BBP which are already implemented and which, 
due to ethical considerations, do not allow for more reliable experimental design.     3
services.  The following variables were used in the analysis: individual and household 
characteristics (such as per capita consumption, region, strata, sex, age, and employment 
status), cost of doctor visits, overall health expenditures, health care utilization, and type 
of treatment. We define morbidity as a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the 
individual claimed to have been sick/injured in the past four weeks. Among those, an 
additional dummy was constructed for those who claimed having been seriously ill. 
Another important variable used is a dummy for those who were seeking care if they 
reported being sick. This helps to differentiate preventative care from required care. 
Individuals who received any treatment when sick reported to have used one of the 
following providers: doctors, healers, home treatment (self-prescription), private 
physicians, and hospitals. Given the limited sample size, we were unable to gather 
detailed information for those who were hospitalized or used a healer (among individuals 
registered for poverty family benefits only 64 were hospitalized and 24 received heath 
treatment from a healer).  
Data from the 2004 ILCS allows simulating whether or not households are 
entitled to receive family poverty benefits according to a means testing algorithm that 
defines eligibility (see appendix).
3 Based on this algorithm, we constructed a dummy 
variable that takes the value of one if a user is eligible for family poverty benefits and the 
values zero if otherwise. Our sample is delimited to those users identified as being 
eligible. To identify a control group we look at whether “eligible” households are a) 
registered to receive BBP benefits and b) whether they actually get the benefits. Users 
with access to BBP were identified using two primary questions: the first identifies 
whether a user lives in a household registered to get family poverty benefits, and the 
second asks whether the individuals in the household actually receive the benefits. In 
relation to expenditures on health, the survey contains detailed questions on the cost of 
treatment received from different providers. Since the survey was conducted over a 12-
month period, the comparability of the quintiles should not be affected by seasonal 
fluctuations. 
Sample size and simple descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1. Our 
analysis is conducted on those individuals eligible for family poverty benefits who are 
registered for the BBP (3,316 individuals). About 77 % of them (2,422 individuals) 
actually receive BBP benefits while the remaining 13 % (714 individuals), being 
registered, do not yet receive benefits. Given that rural areas are more vulnerable to 
poverty, it is not surprising that eligible families registered (receiving and not receiving) 
benefits are mainly living in rural areas (41 and 57 % respectively). Only 18.8 % of the 
eligible BBP beneficiaries live in Yerevan – the capital. Also, the proportion of eligible 
users who are employed and registered but who do not receive benefits is higher than that 
of employed individuals receiving benefits (36.15 vs. 21.7 %).  
The average age of the individuals in the treatment group is 37 years old vs. 44 in 
the control group; 40 % of the individuals in the treatment group are males vs. 42 % in 
the control group. About 33 (40) % of all individuals in both the treatment (control) 
groups declared to have been sick in the past four weeks. Among those in the treatment 
                                                 
3 2004 ILCS data allow to replicate the main variables needed to estimate household eligibility scores for the poverty 
family benefits system in Armenia. However, data do not contain information to estimate some of parameters included 
in the eligibility formula (they are Pr and Pf; see Appendix for more details). As such, while our eligibility dummy is a 
good proxy for actual eligibility, it may contain some errors of inclusion and exclusion that are beyond our control.     4
(control) group, about 42.21 (32.92) % were severely ill and about 54 (51.5) % received 
any treatment. Among those receiving medical treatment, 26.9 (23.1) % in the treatment 
(control) group visited the doctor and 2.91 (3.93) % were hospitalized.  
These results seem to indicate that morbidity, utilization rates, and cost of 
treatment does not differ much among individuals in the treatment and control groups. 
The main empirical question consists in testing whether utilization rates and cost of 
outpatient treatment differs among individuals in the treatment and control groups. To 
answer the question we rely on propensity score matching techniques. 
We denote the eligible individuals registered for the basic benefit package as 
BBP. Let BBP = 1 for those among them who receive benefits and BBP = 0 for those not 
yet receiving benefits. For values of BBP equal to j = {0,1} we get a vector of outcomes 
Yj. The parameter of interest, denoted by POI, shows the difference between outcomes of 
interest in the treated state (Y1) with the outcomes in the control state (Y0) conditional on 
receiving treatment.  
For any individual i, the vector of outcomes Yij (in this case, outcomes such as 
utilization and cost of treatment) is defined as ij j ij Z Y ε μ + = ) (  where Z denotes a vector 
of characteristics (observables and not observables) and ε denotes an error term. The 
average expected outcome for both the treatment and control groups can be defined 
as ) | ( ) ( Z Y E Z j j = μ . We are interested in the parameter POI, which measures the effect 
of the program on the participants [or the average effect of treatment on the treated]: 
) 1 | ( ) 1 | ( ) 1 | ( ) 1 | ( 0 1 0 1 = − = = = Δ = = − = BBP Y E BBP Y E BBP Y E BBP Y Y E POI  (1) 
We are able to observe  ) 1 | ( 1 = BBP Y E from the data but not ) 1 | ( 0 = BBP Y E , 
which is the counterfactual of interest. However, we can observe the average outcome in 
the control state ) 0 | ( 0 = BBP Y E , which we can use as an estimate for the counterfactual. 
One should expect in general that  ) 1 | ( 0 = BBP Y E ≠ ) 0 | ( 0 = BBP Y E because of selection 
bias. The central problem becomes then to obtain a good estimate for the unobservable 
component.  
We cannot simply assume that BBP is independent of the factors that influence Y. 
In other words, participants and non-participants are different in many ways, including 
the effect of the program. Therefore, 
 ) 0 | ( ) 1 | ( ) 1 | ( 0 1 = − = ≠ = Δ BBP Y E BBP Y E BBP Y E .   (2)  
The last term in equation (2) can we re-written as:  
)] 0 | ( ) 1 | ( [ ) 1 | (
) 0 | ( ) 1 | (
0 0
0 1
= − = + = Δ
= = − =
BBP Y E BBP Y E BBP Y E
BBP Y E BBP Y E
 (3) 
Propensity score matching provides a way to estimate  ) 1 | ( = Δ BBP Y E  under the 
assumption that, conditional on observable characteristics X, participation is independent 
of outcomes (e.g. treatment status is random conditional on X); 
X Y Y | BBP         ) , ( 1 0 ⊥        ( 4 )  
This property in known as the conditional independence assumption (CIA). In our 
case, the vector X includes demographic characteristics, such as sex, age, square of age; 
socio-economic characteristics, such as whether or not the individual lives in poor 
households and whether the individual is employed or not; and the health status of the 
individual, proxied by whether or not the individual declares to have been sick in the four   5
weeks prior to the interview. Using Dehajia and Wahba’s (2002) methodology, tests on 
our data suggest than the CIA property holds. This is not surprising since, as mentioned 
before, the differences in mean values of variables included in X  are not significant 
between the treatment and control groups.
4 If the assumption in equation (4) holds true, 
then: 
) ( ) ( ) 1 | ( ) ( 0 1 X X BBP Y E X POI μ μ − = = Δ =   (5) 
In other words, the estimated impact of the program on participation is the 
difference in mean Y, conditional on X, between participant and non-participants. If the 
CIA holds, we can estimate (5) using propensity score matching techniques (Rosembaum 
and Rubin, 1983) so that instead of conditioning on X we can condition on the propensity 
score P(X) = Pr(BBP=1|X). An advantage of this approach is that the dimension of the 
propensity score is one. In such a case the CIA can be expressed as:  
)) ( , 0 | ( )) ( , 1 | ( 0 0 X P BBP Y E X P BBP Y E = = =    (6) 
If (6) holds, we can estimate the parameter of interest in equation (1) as follows:  
)) ( , 0 | ( )) ( , 1 | ( )) ( , 1 | ( ) ( 0 1 X P BBP Y E X P BBP Y E X P BBP Y E X POI = − = = = Δ =  (7) 
To estimate (7) we rely on kernel matching so that all treated observations are 
matched with a weighted average of all controls that are inversely proportional to the 
distance between the propensity scores of treated and controls. Additionally, to check the 
robustness of our results we use radius and local linear matching techniques. Our 
estimates impose the common support restriction so that observations with matches 
outside of the boundaries of the common support (or probability of being treated given 
that they are not) are excluded. In this case, by imposing this restriction we do not lose 
many degrees of freedom because most of our matches happen to be within support.
5 
Table 2 presents the estimates of the bias in the dependent variable due to observable 
characteristics and provides the region of common support.  
To correct the bias that may arise from differences in observable characteristics 
between the individuals in the treatment and control groups, our propensity score 
matching model controls for socio-economic conditions of the individuals (whether the 
individual is poor and employed), health status if the individuals (whether the individual 
reported being ill in the past 4 weeks and whether or not he/she received treatment), and 
demographic characteristics of those registered in the program (such as age, square of 
age, and gender). Figure 2 presents the distribution of matches within support of the 
propensity score for the entire sample. The figure suggests good properties of our sample: 
first, that most matches are within support; second, the degrees of freedom in the 
different intervals of the propensity score are sufficient for proper matching.  
 
3.   Results 
 
                                                 
4 Stratum (urban vs. rural) dummies were excluded from the analysis because they did not satisfy the balancing 
property. This result was somehow expected because the sample has an intrinsic rural bias. 
5 With radius matching each treated person is matched only with the control person whose propensity score falls in a 
predefined neighborhood of the propensity score of the treated unit. The smaller the size of the neighborhood the better 
is the quality of the matches, but the probability that a treated person does not find a control person would also 
increase. Local-linear matching is similar to kernel matching but includes a linear term for the balancing score, the 
results of which are helpful in cases asymmetric data.  
   6
  Using the procedure described above we analyze three main outcomes that could 
be associated with the BBP benefits: cost of treatment, utilization rates, and economic 
burden of health utilization proxied by the share of health expenditure cost in the non-
food consumption budget. Results are summarized in Table 3. The first set of results 
suggest that individuals in the control group (those eligible and registered in the BBP but 
not receiving benefits) pay 45.15 % more for health treatment than individuals actually 
receiving BBP benefits. The same result holds if we restrict the analysis to those 
individuals who are poor but the magnitude of the effect is lower (26 %). These results 
are intuitive because BBP beneficiaries pay subsidized fees while other users do not. 
Note that unmatched results give a different message: that all (poor) eligible BBP 
recipients would pay on average 26 (25) % less (more) for treatment. These findings are 
robust to the choice of matching techniques as presented at the bottom of Table 3.   
  Given that the cost of health treatment is lower for eligible BBP beneficiaries, one 
would expect them to have higher utilization rates. Indeed, results in Table 3 suggest that 
utilization rates for doctor visits are 8 %age points higher (about 36 %) for the treatment 
group as compared to the control group. A similar result holds if we delimit the sample to 
the poor. Yet, utilization rates for BBP beneficiaries are low at 25 %. Low rates of 
utilization in developing countries are often related to affordability constraints. The last 
set of numbers in Table 3 present health expenditure outcomes for households in the 
treatment and control groups.  
Kernel matching results show that households spend on average about 2.5 % of 
their monthly non-food consumption every time a family member visits a doctor. In total, 
the average household having a sick family member spends about 12 to 17 % of their 
monthly non-food consumption on health. These results demonstrate that in addition to 
high outpatient costs, households face large non-fee related expenditures, mainly on 
prescription medicines. As presented in Table 3, prescription medicines (proxied by the 
expenses for home treatment) account for 12 % of all non-food expenditures.  
  
4.   Conclusions 
 
This article analyzes the extent to which subsidizing health care in Armenia 
increases utilization among the poor. Our analysis suggests that eligible individuals 
registered in the family poverty benefits system who are BBP recipients display higher 
utilization rates (and pay about half of the price for doctor visits) than similar individuals 
who are not BBP recipients. In this sense, the program seems to be achieving its goals. 
However, there is scope for improvement since overall utilization rates remain low even 
among BBP recipients. This phenomenon occurs because health care treatment remains 
expensive (mainly because of the high cost of prescription medicines) even for those 
benefiting from subsidized health under the poverty family benefit system. This result is 
common among programs which provide financial relief for items that are not necessarily 
the main affordability constraint. If the goal of the BBP is to promote utilization more 
aggressively, the program could subsidize heath costs beyond doctor fees. Furthermore, 
the government should make sure that payments for medical treatment that are transferred 
from the state treasury to doctors and hospitals upon the provision of services to BBP 
beneficiaries are more aligned with market prices. A large difference between the actual 
costs of treatment and those that the program disburses to medical institutions provides   7
incentives to doctors and medical practitioners to charge large informal (under-the-table) 
fees.  Finally, the program could consider the possibility to provide subsidies for 
prescription drugs, which constitute a large component of the overall expenditures on 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics and Sample Size.  










Demographics       
%  Male  40.33 42.35 46.26 45.59 
    [0.01] [0.02] [0.40] [0.34] 
Average  Age  37.07 44.43 34.21 34.05 
    [0.56] [1.08] [0.17] [0.15] 
%  Employed  21.65 36.15 38.64 36.34 
    [0.01] [0.02] [0.39] [0.33] 
Region      
%  Yerevan  18.81 15.30 38.42 31.76 
    [0.01] [0.02] [0.40] [0.32] 
%  Urban  40.54 28.20 29.23 30.66 
    [0.01] [0.02] [0.33] [0.29] 
%  Rural  40.65 56.50 32.35 37.58 
    [0.01] [0.02] [0.39] [0.34] 
Morbidity      
%  Sick  32.50 39.65 18.11 20.80 
    [0.01] [0.02] [0.31] [0.71] 
% Severe Ill if Sick  42.21  32.92  39.04  37.32 
    [0.02] [0.03] [0.94] [1.48] 
% Treated if sick   54.00  51.48  56.96  54.91 
    [0.02] [0.03] [0.95] [1.55] 
Type of treatment if Sick      
% Visit doctor  26.99  23.07  34.62  31.38 
    [0.02] [0.03] [0.91] [0.69] 
%  Hospitalized  2.91 3.93 4.97 4.10 
    [0.01] [0.01] [0.41] [0.29] 
% Private Physician  2.63  2.45  5.03  4.27 
    [0.01] [0.01] [0.41] [0.29] 
% Treated at home  38.77  40.75  37.86  37.65 
    [0.02] [0.03] [0.93] [0.72] 
%  Healer  0.95 0.27 0.95 0.89 
    [0.00] [0.00] [0.18] [0.13] 
        
Total Observations  2422  714  18777  26614 
Source: Authors using Armenia ILCS data. Standard errors in brackets.   9
Table 2: Direct estimates of the bias in the dependent variable due to observable 
characteristics [Probit results].  
Dep. Var.: Receiving benefits 
if eligible and registered in 
BBP 
Matching model for outcome 
on utilization if sick 
Matching model for outcome 
on burden if treated (If sick) 
  All Poor All Poor 
      
Socio Economic Condition      
Individual  is Poor  0.13**  -  0.151**  - 
 0.05  -  (0.059)  - 
Health Status      
Morbidity is last 4 weeks  0.04**  (0.026)**  -  - 
 0.06  0.087  -  - 
Visit doctor if Sick  -  -  0.060      
  -  -  (0.064)       
Demographics      
Male dummy  -0.09  (0.028)**  -0.093  -0.024 
 0.05  0.074  (0.060)  (0.073) 
Age 0.01**  0.011**  0.000  0.003 
 0.00  0.007  (0.005)  (0.006) 
Square of age  (0.00)*  0.000  0.000  0.000 
 0.00  0.000  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Individual is Employed  (0.40)**  -0.456  -0.359**  -0.330** 
 0.06  0.096  (0.067)  (0.084) 
Constant  0.83 0.880  0.391**  0.401 
 0.08  0.109  (0.107)  (0.133) 
Number of Observations  3123  1590  2022  1346 
Prob. P> chi 2  0.00  0.00  0.000  0.000 
Region of Common Support  [0.5 -  .86]  [0.59 – 0.86]  [0.45 - 0.71]  [0.50- 0.70] 
Source: Authors using Armenia ILCS data. Standard errors in parentheses.   10
Table 3: Propensity score results using kernel matching [eligible and registered in 
BBP]  
  All  Poor  All  Poor 
   NM M NM M NM M NM M 
   Cost of treatment (in $LC)  Visit Doctor (in %age) 
Outcome for Treated  790.37  741.79 177.46 182.08  0.29  0.29  0.25  0.25 
Outcome for Control  1068.80  1352.44 141.41  245.66  0.24  0.21  0.14  0.20 
Difference -278.43  -610.65  36.05 -63.58  0.05  0.08  0.11  0.05 
    (267.91)   (68.66)   (0.02)    (0.03) 
% Difference  -26.05  -45.15  25.49 -25.88 20.38 35.93 77.28 25.37 
Total observations                     
Number of Treated  789  -   355   -  789   -  355  -  
Number of Controls  253  -   99   -  253   -  99  -  
Observation on support                        
Number of Treated  780  -   346   -  779   -  335  -  
Number of Controls  253  -   99   -  253   -  99  -  
  Doctor visit as % of nonfood  Health as % of nonfood 
Outcome for Treated  2.53  2.37 1.52 1.51  17.38  17.13  12.27  12.59 
Outcome for Control  2.89  3.36 1.62 0.71  17.12  15.16  12.16  10.49 
Difference  -0.37 -0.99 -0.10 0.80 0.27 1.97 0.11 2.10 
   (0.62)  (0.57)  (1.26)  (1.95) 
% Difference  -12.70  -29.56  -6.20 111.94 1.55  13.03  0.94  20.02 
Total observations                         
Number of Treated  491  -   196  -   491  -   196  -  
Number of Controls  170  -   57  -   170  -   57  -  
Observation on support                      
Number of Treated  475  -   182  -   475  -   182  -  
Number of Controls  170  -   57  -   170  -   57  -  
  Treatment at home (medicines) as % of 
nonfood 
 
Outcome for Treated  11.62  11.70  8.08  8.38  -  -  -  - 
Outcome for Control  11.89  9.08  8.56  4.27         
Difference  -0.27 2.63 -0.49 4.11  -  -  -  - 
   (0.97)  (1.32)        
%  Difference  -2.30 28.94 -5.72 96.16  -  -  -  - 
Total observations                     
Number of Treated  491  -   196  -   -  -  -  - 
Number of Controls  170  -   57  -          
Observation  on  support             
Number of Treated  475  -   182  -   -  -  -  - 
Number of Controls  170  -   57  -          
  Other Matching Methods: Cost of treatment  (in $LC) 
   Radius matching   Local Linear Matching 
Outcome for Treated  630.42  630.42 194.89 195.34 630.42 630.42 194.89 195.34 
Outcome for Control  1141.43  1022.44 421.03  360.77 1141.43  1113.51 421.03  351.57 
Difference  -511.01 -392.02 -226.14 -165.42 -511.01 -483.09 -226.14 -156.22 
     (139.98)     (65.49)     (141.39)     (37.17) 
%  Difference  -44.77 -38.34 -53.71 -45.85 -44.77 -43.38 -53.71 -44.44 
Total observations                        
Number of Treated  782.00   -  485.00  -  782.00  -  485.00   - 
Number of Controls  1240.00   -  861.00  -  1240.00  -   861.00   - 
Observation on support                        
Number of Treated  782.00   -  485.00  -  782.00  -   485.00   - 
Number of Controls  1240.00   -  859.00  -  1240.00  -  859.00   - 
Source: Authors using Armenia ILCS data. Standard errors in parentheses. NM= not matched, M=matched.    11
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Figure 2: Distribution of matches within support of the propensity score [Eligible 
and registered in BBP] 
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Appendix 
 
Eligibility to Family Poverty Benefits in Armenia 
From Posarac (2006) 
 
In January 1999, Armenia introduced monthly family poverty benefit in cash, targeted at 
the very poor households using a proxy means-testing (PMT) mechanism.  The proxy 
means-testing formula consists of the following variables:  
-  social category of each of the family members, or individual “social 
risk” (Pk) and related average “social risk” for the family (Pm);  
-  number of the family members not capable of working (Pc);  
-  place of residence (Pr);  
-  housing situation (Ph);  
-  car ownership (Pa);  
-  private business (Pb);  
-  the document issued by respective territorial center for social services 
verifying the social and economic situation of the applicant family (Pf) 
and its eligibility for the benefit (“eligible” and “not eligible”); 
-  family income (Pi). 
The score of the family need (P) is calculated using the following formula: 
P =  Pm * Pc * Pr * Ph * Pa * Pb * Pf * Pi  
(a) Socio-economic category of each of the family members (individual social risk)—Pk 
and related average “social risk” for the family (Pm).  This is the most important element 
in calculating the score of the family need.       
Each family member is screened for a certain social category, e.g. for whether she/he 
belongs to a certain category of “social risk”.  Each category brings a certain number of 
points.  The number reflects the assumed level of need of each category.  The list of 
categories and corresponding number of points is presented in the following table.   
   
  Social category  Points 
1  Biological orphan (no parents)  50 
2 First  category  disabled  48 
3  Child invalid (up to 16)  45 
4 Biological  orphan  (one parent deceased)  43 
5  Second category disabled  39 
6 Pensioner  (75+)  39 
7 Single  pensioner  36 
8  Child below 2 year of age  35 
9 Pensioner  34 
10 Child  2-18  33 
11  Pregnant women (20+ weeks)  30 
12  Third category disabled (below pension age)  28 
13 Unemployed  27 
14 Single  mother  child  26 
15  Child of divorced parents  26 
16  Public university student  22 
17  No social category   20   14
  In cases where one person belongs to several social categories, a weighted 
average is calculated.  The weights are as follows: for the category with the highest 
number of points 1.0; for the second highest 0.3 and for the third and all the rest 0.1.  For 
instance, a person can be a 17-year old child (category 10), with divorced parents 
(category 15), a student (category 16) and a third category disabled (category 12).   
Her/his individual social category (or “social risk”) score is calculated in the following 
way: 
  P k(ind) = P10 + 0.3*P12 + 0.1*(P15+P16) = 33+0.3*28+0.1(26+22) = 46.2 
The average “social risk” score for a family is calculated as arithmetic mean of the family 
members scores. 
(b) Number of family members not capable of working (Pc).  The value of this factor is 
calculated in the following way: Pc = 1.0 + 0.02*m, where m is the number of the family 
members incapable of working, namely children up to 16, women over 63, men over 65 
and first and second category disabled.   
(c) Place of residence (Pr).  For most of the settlements in Armenia, the value of this 
factor is one.  However, there is a list of 173 settlements (in the earthquake zone and 
border territories) for which the coefficient ranges between 1.03 and 1.05.   
(d) Housing situation (Ph).   Housing situation is classified into 6 categories with the 
following coefficients: “domik” (temporary shelter such as a carriage, a barrack, etc., in 
particular in the earthquake zone) – 1.2; homeless – 1.07; unsafe dwelling – 1.05; 
collective center for internally displaced persons – 1.03; other – 1.02; permanent dwelling 
– 1. 
(e) Filter variables (0 or 1).  The following factors are used as filters: a car ownership 
(Pa), private business (Pb), and a document issued by respective territorial center for 
social services verifying the social and economic situation of the applicant family and its 
eligibility for the benefit (Pf).  Their value can be either 1 or 0.  Obviously, 0 for any of 
the three (the family has a car and uses it, the family or its members are running private 
business and the social services center has assessed the family as ineligible for the 
benefit) eliminates the family from the list of beneficiaries.     
(f)  Family income.  The family income coefficient is calculated using the following 
formula:  
   P i = 1.2 – 0.04*(ΣSj/m*M)   (j=1...n) 
Where n is the number of the household members, sj is the income of the j-th household 
member, m is the number of the present household members, and M is the minimum 
wage (regulated by the Government).  The income includes wages and salaries, income 
from self-employment, pensions, stipends and unemployment compensation.  Income 
from farming is estimated based on cadastral income, while income from cattle breeding 
is estimated separately using a methodology regulated by the Government.  
The qualifying score:  Currently, the score that qualifies the household for the benefit is 
34.01.  This score is determined once per year in the following way: all applicant 
households are ranked by their scores.  The cut off point is decided upon based on 
available resources.             